KB5127648 breaks 802.1X PEAP Wi-Fi authentication on Windows 11: cause and workarounds

Update, 14 October 2026: Microsoft has not yet listed the KB5127648 802.1X PEAP authentication failure as a known issue on the Windows release health dashboard or in the KB article. Everything below is based on reproducible reports from administrators, Microsoft’s own NTLMv1 documentation and my own customer cases. I will update this post when Microsoft publishes an official statement.

The October 2026 Patch Tuesday update for Windows 11, KB5127648 (OS builds 26100.9711, 26200.9711 and 26300.9711 for 24H2, 25H2 and 26H2), was released on 13 October 2026. Within hours, administrators started reporting that domain-joined clients could no longer authenticate to WPA2-Enterprise Wi-Fi using 802.1X PEAP. Wired 802.1X PEAP is affected too. WPA2-Personal and WPA3-Personal networks keep working, which is why the problem often looks like “the Wi-Fi is broken at the office but fine at home”.

I got the first call from a customer this morning: “Clients suddenly refuse to connect to our Wi-Fi, and there were no problems yesterday.” That is the fingerprint of this issue. Here is what we know, how to confirm it on an affected device, and what you can do about it today.

Symptoms of the KB5127648 802.1X PEAP issue

  • Clients on Windows 11 24H2, 25H2 or 26H2 with KB5127648 installed fail to connect to WPA2-Enterprise (802.1X) Wi-Fi.
  • Wired 802.1X PEAP on Ethernet shows “Connected, not authenticated” and loops on a 600 second block timer.
  • Authentication starts but never completes. The request never reaches the RADIUS/NPS server, so there is nothing to find in the NPS log.
  • Both machine authentication and user authentication with “Use my Windows user account” fail. Manually typing DOMAIN\username and password in the Wi-Fi prompt has been reported to work.
  • Intel and Qualcomm Wi-Fi chipsets are both affected, so this is not a driver problem.
  • Uninstalling KB5127648 and rebooting restores connectivity. Reinstalling it breaks it again.

How to confirm it in Event Viewer

Open Event Viewer and go to Applications and Services Logs > Microsoft > Windows > WLAN-AutoConfig > Operational (or Wired-AutoConfig > Operational for Ethernet). On an affected device you will see this sequence:

LogEvent IDMessage
WLAN-AutoConfig12011Wireless 802.1X authentication started successfully (PEAP)
WLAN-AutoConfig12014Authentication restarted, reason: OneX Held State timeout
WLAN-AutoConfig12013Authentication failed, error 0x80070285 (internal authentication error)
Wired-AutoConfig15514Authentication FAILED, reason 0x50005, error 0x80070285
Wired-AutoConfig15506Authentication suspended, Explicit EAP failure received, BlockingTime 600
EapHost2088User uses saved credentials (the only EapHost event, no Schannel certificate errors)

If the root cause below is correct, you will also find Event ID 4025 in Microsoft-Windows-NTLM > Operational: “An attempt to use NTLMv1-derived credentials for Single Sign-On was blocked due to policy.” Before the update, the same device would have logged the audit-only Event ID 4024 instead.

The likely root cause: NTLMv1 SSO is now blocked by default

Microsoft announced in 2025 that it would tighten NTLMv1 handling in Windows 11 24H2 and Windows Server 2025. The timeline in the support article Upcoming changes to NTLMv1 in Windows 11, version 24H2 and Windows Server 2025 is explicit:

  • Late August 2025: Audit logging for NTLMv1 usage enabled on Windows 11 24H2 and newer.
  • November 2025: Rollout of the changes to Windows Server 2025.
  • October 2026: The default value of the BlockNtlmv1SSO registry key changes from Audit mode (0) to Enforce mode (1). This only takes effect if the key has not been deployed explicitly.

The same article names the exact scenario that breaks: remnants of NTLMv1 cryptography are still used “when using MS-CHAPv2 in a domain-joined environment”, and the examples given are “Wi-Fi, Ethernet, and VPN deployments using MS-CHAPv2 authentication”. PEAP with the MS-CHAPv2 inner method, which is what most password-based enterprise Wi-Fi still runs on, needs the NTLMv1-derived credential for single sign-on with the logged-on user or the machine account. When Enforce mode blocks that request, EAP fails locally with 0x80070285 before a single packet reaches your RADIUS server.

The KB5127648 article does not mention NTLM, 802.1X or PEAP at all, and Microsoft’s release notes said it was not aware of any new issues apart from a USB audio problem. So the causal link is inferred from the timeline and the fact that setting the key back to 0 fixes the problem. Treat it as very likely, not confirmed.

Workaround 1: Pause the update and uninstall it on affected devices

If you manage updates with Windows Autopatch, Intune update rings or WSUS, pause the October quality update now so it does not reach more devices. If you are mid-way through a 26H2 rollout, see my post on getting ready for Windows 11 26H2 with Autopatch for how the rings and pause controls fit together. On devices that are already broken, uninstall the update and reboot:

wusa /uninstall /kb:5127648

Keep in mind that this removes the October security fixes, and that the device needs a working network to receive anything from Intune. A device without Wi-Fi cannot download a remediation script, so plan for a wired connection, a phone hotspot or hands-on work.

Workaround 2: Set BlockNtlmv1SSO back to Audit mode

Several administrators have confirmed that explicitly deploying the registry value restores PEAP authentication while keeping KB5127648 installed. This is the approach Neowin and Windows Report describe:

reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0" /v BlockNtlmv1SSO /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

Reboot afterwards. The value means:

  • 0 (Audit): The request to generate NTLMv1 credentials for a logged-on user is audited but allowed. Event 4024 is logged.
  • 1 (Enforce): The request is blocked and Event 4025 is logged. This is the new default after KB5127648.

Be honest with yourself about what this does: you are rolling back a security hardening that Microsoft has been announcing for over a year. It buys time, nothing more. One administrator in the Microsoft Q&A thread put it well: setting it to 0 “only bought us time”.

Deploying the value with Intune

There is no Settings Catalog entry or Policy CSP node for this value, so use a Remediation script (Devices > Scripts and remediations) or a PowerShell script. A minimal pair that is safe to run repeatedly:

# Detect-BlockNtlmv1SSO.ps1
$path = 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0'
$value = (Get-ItemProperty -Path $path -Name BlockNtlmv1SSO -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).BlockNtlmv1SSO
if ($value -eq 0) { Write-Output 'Compliant'; exit 0 }
Write-Output "Non-compliant (value: $value)"; exit 1

# Remediate-BlockNtlmv1SSO.ps1
$path = 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0'
New-ItemProperty -Path $path -Name BlockNtlmv1SSO -PropertyType DWord -Value 0 -Force | Out-Null
Write-Output 'BlockNtlmv1SSO set to 0 (Audit). Reboot required.'
exit 0

Run it in the 64-bit PowerShell host, in system context, and target it at the devices that are not yet updated first. Devices that are already off the network will pick it up as soon as they get any connectivity.

The real fix: move from PEAP-MSCHAPv2 to EAP-TLS

Password-based PEAP-MSCHAPv2 has been on borrowed time for years. It depends on NTLM-era cryptography, it is vulnerable to credential relay if clients do not validate the server certificate strictly, and Microsoft is clearly moving toward blocking it. The durable answer is certificate-based EAP-TLS, which does not touch NTLM at all and is unaffected by this change.

  • Cloud-native tenants: Microsoft Cloud PKI in Intune Suite can issue device and user certificates via SCEP, and your NPS or cloud RADIUS validates them. No on-premises CA required.
  • Hybrid tenants with AD CS: Use your existing enterprise CA with an Intune Certificate Connector (SCEP or PKCS) and switch the NPS network policy to Microsoft: Smart Card or other certificate.
  • Either way: Push a new Wi-Fi profile from Intune with EAP-TLS, keep the PEAP SSID running in parallel until every device has a certificate, then retire it.

If you are also deploying Credential Guard (and you should be), note that Microsoft’s NTLMv1 article recommends it strongly. Credential Guard already blocks NTLMv1 and unconstrained delegation on its own, so a device with Credential Guard enabled is likely to have hit this wall earlier in testing.

What to tell your users and your helpdesk

  • Home Wi-Fi, hotspots and guest networks with a simple passphrase still work. Only the corporate 802.1X network is affected.
  • Typing the domain username and password manually in the Wi-Fi prompt is a usable emergency workaround for individual users.
  • Do not let users “reset network settings” or reinstall Wi-Fi drivers. It wastes time and changes nothing.

References

Windows 11 26H2 Is Here: What to Do with Autopilot and Intune (and How to Report on It)

Windows 11 26H2 is generally available as of September 29, 2026. For most organizations running Windows Autopilot and Microsoft Intune, this is the calmest annual feature update in years: devices on 24H2 or 25H2 get a tiny enablement package and a single restart. But “calm” is not the same as “nothing to do”. There are lifecycle deadlines only weeks away, a new Windows 11 branch (26H1) that cannot take 26H2 at all, features that are now switched on by default for commercial devices, and a reporting stack that simply shows nothing if you have not flipped the right switches.

This post is the practical version: what Windows 11 26H2 actually is, what to do in Intune and Autopilot this week, what to be aware of before you press deploy, and how to report on the rollout so you can prove where every device is. All screenshots are from my own tenant, taken on release day.

If you want the Autopatch ring design and pilot-to-production exit criteria in more depth, I covered that earlier in Windows 11 26H2: Upgrade Paths, Autopatch & Pilot to Production. This post focuses on the GA release itself, Autopilot, Intune policy and reporting.

Windows 11 26H2 at a glance

General availabilitySeptember 29, 2026
Build26300 (10.0.26300.x)
Delivery for 24H2 and 25H2Enablement package (KB5121794), single restart
Delivery for 23H2 and Windows 10Full feature update (media-based, several GB)
Windows 11 26H1 devicesNot eligible for 26H2 (different Windows core)
Servicing36 months for Enterprise and Education, 24 months for Home and Pro
Hardware requirementsUnchanged from Windows 11 (TPM 2.0, UEFI Secure Boot, supported CPU)

Windows 11 24H2, 25H2 and 26H2 share one servicing branch. The code for most 26H2 features has already been delivered to your devices through the monthly cumulative updates, sitting dormant. The enablement package flips the version to 26H2, activates the features that were held back and resets the support clock. That is why Microsoft calls it a “predictable and low-disruption update”, and why app compatibility testing you already did on 24H2 or 25H2 largely carries forward.

Why you should not wait: the lifecycle dates that matter now

The most important reason to act on Windows 11 26H2 this month has nothing to do with new features. It is the support calendar:

  • Windows 11 24H2 Home and Pro reaches end of servicing on October 13, 2026. That is two weeks after 26H2 GA. Many small and mid-size businesses run Pro, often on Autopilot devices that shipped from the OEM with 24H2.
  • Windows 11 23H2 Enterprise and Education ends on November 11, 2026. These devices need a full feature update, not the enablement package.
  • Windows 11 24H2 Enterprise and Education is supported until October 13, 2027, and 25H2 Enterprise and Education until October 11, 2028.

If you have Pro devices on 24H2, 26H2 (or at minimum 25H2) needs to be on them before mid-October. The good news is that the enablement package makes that realistic even on a short timeline.

Step 1: Find out what you actually have

Before you create a single policy, get an honest inventory of Windows versions in the tenant. The quickest view is Devices > Windows > Windows devices with the OS version column visible. Build numbers map to versions like this:

BuildVersionPath to 26H2
10.0.19045Windows 10 22H2Full upgrade (hardware permitting)
10.0.22631Windows 11 23H2Full feature update
10.0.26100Windows 11 24H2Enablement package
10.0.26200Windows 11 25H2Enablement package
10.0.26300Windows 11 26H2Already there
10.0.28000Windows 11 26H1Not eligible, stays on the 26H1 path

My own tenant is a good example of why this matters. It is small, but it already contains three different stories: several 25H2 devices (26200) that will take the enablement package, one 23H2 device (22631) that needs a full upgrade, and one brand-new device on 26H1 (28000) that will never be offered 26H2.

Windows 11 26H2 Intune Windows devices OS version column
Windows devices in Intune with the OS version column: 25H2 (26200), 23H2 (22631) and a 26H1 device (28000) in the same tenant.

For anything beyond a handful of devices, export the list or pull it with Microsoft Graph PowerShell and group by build:

Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All"

$map = @{ '19045'='Win10 22H2'; '22631'='23H2'; '26100'='24H2'; '26200'='25H2'; '26300'='26H2'; '28000'='26H1' }

Get-MgDeviceManagementManagedDevice -All -Filter "operatingSystem eq 'Windows'" -Property "deviceName,osVersion" |
    Group-Object { ($_.OsVersion -split '\.')[2] } |
    Select-Object @{n='Build';e={$_.Name}}, @{n='Version';e={$map[$_.Name]}}, Count |
    Sort-Object Build

Pay special attention to edition. A 24H2 device on Enterprise has another year of support; the same build on Pro runs out on October 13.

Step 2: Clean up your update rings before you deploy

Feature update policies and update rings work together, and the combination is where most “why is nothing happening?” tickets come from. Microsoft’s guidance is clear: when you use a feature update policy, set the feature update deferral period in the update ring that targets the same devices to 0 days. The feature update policy then controls which version the device gets and when. A ring that still defers feature updates can block or delay the version you are trying to deliver, and the device will report PolicyConflictDeferral in the failure report.

Intune update rings with feature update deferral before Windows 11 26H2 rollout
Update rings in my tenant: several rings still defer feature updates by 5 to 7 days. Set this to 0 days on rings that share devices with a feature update policy.

While you are in the rings, check three more things:

  • Paused rings. A ring that was paused during an incident and never resumed will stop 26H2 as effectively as a deferral (PolicyConflictPause).
  • Windows 10 leftovers. Rings and policies named for Windows 10 often still carry old settings. Windows 10 reached end of support on October 14, 2025, and any remaining devices need an upgrade plan or ESU.
  • Conflicting GPOs. On hybrid or co-managed devices, a WSUS or deferral GPO that still applies will fight the MDM policy. Confirm the Windows Update workload sits with Intune.

Step 3: Create the Windows 11 26H2 feature update policy

Go to Devices > Windows > Windows updates > Feature updates. On release day the tab already shows Autopatch update readiness tiles, and in my tenant a yellow banner that we will come back to in the reporting section. The Create menu now offers both a classic Feature Update Policy and an Autopatch multi-phase release.

Intune Windows updates Feature updates tab with Autopatch update readiness
The Feature updates tab with Autopatch update readiness and a warning that Windows diagnostic data features are not enabled.

Choose Feature Update Policy. Windows 11, version 26H2 is already the default in the Feature update to deploy list, alongside 25H2, 24H2 and 23H2. Note that 26H1 is not in the list: it is not a feature update target, it is a separate branch for specific new hardware.

Intune feature update policy with Windows 11 version 26H2 selected
Creating a feature update deployment: Windows 11, version 26H2 is available and selected by default on GA day.

Settings I recommend for the first wave:

  • Name: something that tells the next admin what it is, for example WIN-FU-26H2-Pilot.
  • Required vs. optional: use Make available to users as a required update for managed rollout. The optional setting is useful for a self-service early adopter group, but you give up control of timing.
  • Rollout options: As soon as possible for the pilot, Gradually for broad. Gradual rollout spreads offers across groups and days, which protects your network and your service desk.
  • Assignments: device groups, not user groups. Start with IT, then a pilot of 5 to 10 percent across hardware models and departments, then broad.

Two behaviors to keep in mind. First, a feature update policy is also a “stay here” instruction: devices targeted by an existing 24H2 or 25H2 policy will not move to 26H2 until you change or replace that policy. Search for old feature update policies before you wonder why nothing happens. Second, a device should be in exactly one feature update policy. If it lands in two, the failure report shows DeploymentConflict and only the first assigned deployment is effective. Use exclusions to keep pilot and broad groups mutually exclusive.

If you use Windows Autopatch, create an Autopatch multi-phase release instead and let the Test, First, Fast and Broad rings stagger 26H2 for you. Plan any group changes first: you cannot edit an Autopatch group while a feature update release is in progress for it.

What to do if you use Windows Autopilot

Autopilot does not install a new Windows version. It provisions whatever image the OEM put on the device, whether that is 24H2, 25H2 or eventually 26H2. What happens after enrollment is controlled by your update policies. That leads to a few concrete tasks.

Make sure new devices land in the 26H2 policy on day one

New hardware arriving this quarter will mostly ship with 24H2 or 25H2. If your broad 26H2 policy targets a static group that nobody updates, every new Autopilot device will be one version behind from its first boot, and new Pro devices on 24H2 are two weeks from end of servicing. Target the policy at the same dynamic or device preparation device group your Autopilot devices land in, for example a dynamic group on the Autopilot ZTDID attribute:

(device.devicePhysicalIDs -any (_ -startsWith "[ZTDId]"))

For Autopilot device preparation, the device group you configure in the device preparation policy works the same way. Because the eKB is only a restart, new devices move to 26H2 shortly after the user has signed in, without a long upgrade experience.

Know what happens during OOBE

The Enrollment Status Page setting Install Windows quality updates (might restart the device) installs the monthly quality update during OOBE. It does not install the 26H2 feature update, so your ESP timing does not change. The version move happens after provisioning, driven by the feature update policy. If you have customers or users who expect “the latest Windows” out of the box, that is the expectation to set.

Look at device association for Autopilot device preparation

Windows 11 26H2 brings device association for Windows Autopilot device preparation. It lets you identify trusted corporate devices before enrollment, which enables device-targeted policies, automatic corporate enrollment and more customization during OOBE. That closes one of the biggest gaps between device preparation and classic Autopilot profiles. It sits under Devices > Windows > Enrollment, right above the device preparation policies.

Intune Windows enrollment with Autopilot device preparation and device association
Windows enrollment in Intune: Windows Backup and Restore, Device association, Autopilot device preparation and classic Windows Autopilot.

Decide on Windows Backup and Restore

In 26H2, Windows settings backup is enabled by default for eligible commercial devices, and the first sign-in restore experience now also supports Microsoft Entra hybrid joined devices, Cloud PCs and multi-user environments. For device refresh with Autopilot this is genuinely useful: the user signs in on the new device and gets settings and their Microsoft Store app list back. Administrator-configured policies are still honored, so if your organization has decided against it, make that decision explicit with the Windows Backup and Restore enrollment setting and the settings catalog, rather than relying on a default that just changed.

Plan for 26H1 hardware

Windows 11 26H1 ships on specific new devices and runs on a different Windows core. Microsoft states that these devices cannot update to 26H2. For Autopilot this means you will enroll a growing number of devices with build 28000 that are newer than 26H2 by build number but are not “on 26H2”. Check anything that makes decisions based on OS version:

  • Compliance policies that use Valid operating system builds ranges, for example 10.0.26100 to 10.0.26300. A 28000 device falls outside and becomes noncompliant, which with Conditional Access means blocked.
  • Dynamic groups and assignment filters on deviceOSVersion or osVersion that use startsWith “10.0.26”.
  • Reports and dashboards that calculate “on latest version” by comparing strings.

Reset, wipe and reimaging

Autopilot Reset and a local wipe reinstall from the device’s current OS, so a device that has taken 26H2 stays on 26H2. If you still maintain a corporate image for reimaging before Autopilot, update it to 26H2 media so reimaged devices do not start their life on a version that is about to go out of support.

What to be aware of in Windows 11 26H2

Most of these changes are good news. They are listed here because each of them can surprise a user, a script or a service desk if you did not know it was coming.

Features that are now on by default for commercial devices

Some features were delivered earlier through monthly updates but held back on commercial devices by temporary enterprise feature control. 26H2 enables them by default: Windows settings backup, app-specific actions from the taskbar, and a set of File Explorer enhancements. Tell your service desk and update end-user documentation before the pilot, not after. Also resist using the AllowTemporaryEnterpriseFeatureControl policy to force dormant features on across production: it bypasses exactly the controlled validation that the enablement model gives you.

WMIC is gone

The WMI command-line tool (WMIC) is removed and is no longer available as a Feature on Demand on 24H2 and later. Search your Intune remediations, platform scripts, Win32 app install commands and detection scripts for wmic and replace it with Get-CimInstance. A detection script that silently fails will make a Win32 app show as “not installed” and trigger reinstall loops.

# Old
wmic bios get serialnumber
# New
(Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_BIOS).SerialNumber

Cross-signed drivers lose default trust

Windows changes how the kernel trusts third-party drivers. Default trust for the old cross-signed driver program is removed. Drivers from the Windows Hardware Compatibility Program and an allow list of trusted legacy drivers are still allowed. Windows audits driver compatibility for at least 100 hours and three restarts before enforcement kicks in, which is exactly the kind of delayed impact that slips past a two-day pilot. Include devices with old scanners, label printers, VPN clients, dongles and specialist lab or production hardware in your pilot, and keep them there long enough.

Hotpatch is on by default for eligible devices

My tenant shows an Hotpatch Enablement banner on the Windows updates page: eligible devices receive hotpatch updates automatically, unless you configured hotpatch yourself in a quality update policy or opt out. That fits well with 26H2, since a feature update restart moves the device to a new baseline and hotpatch keeps restarts down afterwards. Just make sure your change process knows that “patched” no longer always means “restarted”.

New security capabilities are off until you turn them on

Several of the most interesting 26H2 features for Intune admins are available but not enabled. They are worth a proof of concept once the rollout is stable:

  • Administrator protection: just-in-time elevation with profile separation instead of standing admin rights. Enable with Intune or Group Policy, and test together with Endpoint Privilege Management if you use it.
  • Built-in Sysmon: System Monitor is now part of Windows, logs to the Windows Event Log and supports your own configuration files. No more packaging Sysmon as a Win32 app.
  • Smart App Control can be turned on or off without a clean install.
  • Passkey plugin credential managers and Windows Hello Enhanced Sign-in Security with supported external fingerprint readers.
  • Post-quantum cryptography APIs (ML-KEM and ML-DSA) in CNG and .NET.
  • A more secure batch file processing mode that prevents batch files from changing during execution, useful for Application Control for Business policy authors.

Recovery features to configure deliberately

Point-in-time restore can roll a PC back to a recent restore point, including apps, settings and personal files. Quick machine recovery can run a one-time remediation scan, but stays off on domain-joined or enterprise-managed devices unless you enable it. Both are useful for the service desk, and both should be decisions in your baseline rather than something you discover during an incident. The new policy-based removal of preinstalled Microsoft apps also accepts additional MSIX or APPX package family names, which may let you retire a removal script or two.

What users will notice

The redesigned Start menu with a scrollable All section, category and grid views, a taskbar that can move to the top, left or right and a smaller taskbar option, File Explorer and Windows Search improvements, Multi-App Camera, and fewer restarts because Windows Update bundles eligible updates with the monthly security update. None of these need a policy on day one, but a short “what’s new” note to users saves tickets.

Reporting on Windows 11 26H2 in Intune

A rollout you cannot measure is a rollout you cannot finish. Intune has good built-in reporting for feature updates, but it depends on prerequisites that many tenants, including my own, do not have turned on.

Prerequisite: turn on Windows data

Go to Tenant administration > Connectors and tokens > Windows data and enable Enable features that require Windows diagnostic data in processor configuration. For the readiness and compatibility reports, also enable Windows license verification, which confirms you own eligible Windows Enterprise licensing. Devices must send at least Required diagnostic data, and the feature update wizard itself reminds you to enable Windows health monitoring with the Windows Update scope to get detailed device states and errors.

Intune Windows data connector for Windows diagnostic data and license verification
Connectors and tokens > Windows data. Both toggles are off in my tenant, which is why the reports below have nothing to show.

This is a tenant-wide decision with a privacy dimension, so involve whoever owns data processing in your organization. But if it stays off, you are deploying 26H2 blind. This is what the Windows Autopatch feature update report looks like without it:

Windows Autopatch feature updates report not available without prerequisites
Reports > Windows Autopatch > Windows feature updates: “Reports are not available” when the tenant prerequisites are missing.

Service-side data from Windows Update usually arrives within an hour. Client-side data is processed in batches and refreshes about every eight hours, and only after you configure data collection. Turn it on at least a few days before the pilot so you have a baseline.

Before the rollout: readiness and compatibility risks

Go to Reports > Windows updates > Reports. Six reports live here:

Intune Windows updates reports list for Windows 11 26H2 reporting
Reports > Windows updates > Reports: feature update, distribution, expedited, readiness, compatibility risks and driver reports.
  • Windows Feature Update Device Readiness Report: pick Windows 11 26H2 as target OS and get per-device readiness with system requirement, app, driver and other issues. Run it before you assign the broad policy.
  • Windows Feature Update Compatibility Risks Report: the same data turned around, grouped by app and driver, so you can see which single driver blocks 40 devices.
  • Windows Update Distribution Report: how many devices are on each quality update level. Useful because a device far behind on cumulative updates is also a device that tends to struggle with feature updates.

For 24H2 and 25H2 devices the readiness report should be mostly green, as they already run the shared code base. The real value is on 23H2 and Windows 10 devices, which take a full upgrade, and in finding devices that fail Windows 11 hardware requirements.

During the rollout: feature update report and failures

The Windows Feature Update Report (Reports > Windows updates > Reports) shows status per policy. Select your 26H2 policy, generate the report and filter by update status. Each device moves through states such as Offer received, Download start, Install complete, Restart required and finally Update installed. For an enablement package the whole journey is short, so devices stuck in Restart required for days tell you that users are not restarting, not that the update is broken.

The Feature update failures report (Devices > Monitor) is where you troubleshoot. These alerts are the ones I see most in real 26H2-style rollouts:

AlertWhat it meansWhat to do
PolicyConflictDeferralAn update ring defers feature updatesSet feature deferral to 0 days on the ring
PolicyConflictPauseUpdates are paused on the deviceResume the ring or remove the pause GPO
DeploymentConflictDevice is in more than one feature update policyFix group membership and exclusions
SafeguardHoldMicrosoft is holding the update for a known issueLook up the hold ID on Windows release health
IncompatibleServicingChannelDevice is on an Insider or preview channelMove it to the retail (GA) channel
DeviceRegistrationInvalidGlobalDeviceIdDevice cannot register with Windows UpdateMake sure the Microsoft Account Sign-In Assistant service is not disabled
EndOfServiceApproachingThe current version is close to end of servicingPrioritize these devices, typically 24H2 Pro and 23H2

The MSA service one deserves a special mention: many hardening baselines disable the Microsoft Account Sign-In Assistant to block consumer accounts, and that silently breaks Windows Update deployment service registration. Block consumer accounts with the account policy instead and leave the service running.

Proving the result: version counts over time

Management rarely asks “what is the update substate of device 4711”. They ask “how many are done”. Three ways to answer that:

  • Windows devices export or the Graph PowerShell snippet from step 1, run weekly and saved. Simple and works without any prerequisites.
  • Windows Autopatch reports if you deploy with Autopatch: feature update status per Autopatch group and ring.
  • Windows Update for Business reports in Log Analytics for trend lines and custom dashboards.

With Windows Update for Business reports enabled, a simple KQL query gives you the current version distribution across the fleet:

UCClient
| where TimeGenerated > ago(2d)
| summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by AzureADDeviceId
| summarize Devices = count() by OSVersion
| order by Devices desc

Pin it to an Azure workbook, add a line per week and you have the burn-down chart for the 26H2 project. Define your exit criteria up front, for example 95 percent of active devices on 26H2 within 30 days of broad deployment, with the remaining devices individually explained (offline, safeguard hold, 26H1 hardware, pending replacement).

A realistic Windows 11 26H2 rollout plan

For a typical Intune and Autopilot tenant, this is the plan I would run:

  1. Week 0 (now): turn on Windows data and license verification. Inventory versions and editions. Fix ring deferrals, pauses and old feature update policies. Search scripts for WMIC.
  2. Week 0 to 1: run the device readiness and compatibility risks reports for 26H2. Deploy 26H2 as soon as possible to IT devices.
  3. Week 1: pilot group across all hardware models, including devices with legacy drivers. Prioritize 24H2 Pro devices because of the October 13 deadline.
  4. Week 2 to 4: broad deployment with gradual rollout. Add the Autopilot device group so new hardware follows automatically. Start the full upgrade for 23H2 Enterprise devices, which end on November 11.
  5. Week 4 onwards: work the failure report, chase the long tail, and start proof of concepts for Administrator protection, built-in Sysmon and point-in-time restore.

Windows 11 26H2 checklist for Intune and Autopilot

  • Inventory builds and editions; identify 24H2 Pro (Oct 13, 2026) and 23H2 Enterprise (Nov 11, 2026).
  • Set feature update deferral to 0 days on rings that share devices with feature update policies.
  • Replace or retarget existing 24H2 and 25H2 feature update policies.
  • Create a 26H2 feature update policy: IT, pilot, broad, with mutually exclusive groups.
  • Include your Autopilot or device preparation device group in the broad assignment.
  • Handle 26H1 (build 28000) devices in compliance ranges, dynamic groups and filters.
  • Decide explicitly on Windows settings backup and restore.
  • Remove WMIC from scripts and detection rules.
  • Keep legacy-driver devices in the pilot for more than 100 hours and three restarts.
  • Enable Windows data and Windows license verification for reporting.
  • Run readiness and compatibility risk reports before broad deployment.
  • Track Feature update failures and version counts weekly until exit criteria are met.

Frequently asked questions

Is Windows 11 26H2 a full upgrade?

Not for devices on Windows 11 24H2 or 25H2. They receive an enablement package (KB5121794) that activates 26H2 with a single restart. Devices on 23H2 or Windows 10 need a full feature update.

Does Windows Autopilot install Windows 11 26H2 during setup?

No. Autopilot provisions the OS version that is on the device. The Enrollment Status Page can install quality updates during OOBE, but the move to 26H2 happens after provisioning through your feature update policy or Autopatch release.

Can Windows 11 26H1 devices upgrade to 26H2?

No. 26H1 runs on a different Windows core and is not on the 24H2, 25H2 and 26H2 servicing branch. Microsoft will offer those devices their own future upgrade path.

Why are my Intune Windows update reports empty?

Most often because the Windows data connector is off. Enable features that require Windows diagnostic data in processor configuration and, for readiness reports, Windows license verification under Tenant administration > Connectors and tokens > Windows data. Then allow time for data to arrive.

How long is Windows 11 26H2 supported?

As an annual H2 release, 26H2 gets 36 months of servicing for Enterprise and Education and 24 months for Home and Pro, counted from GA.

Wrapping up

Windows 11 26H2 is the kind of release that rewards preparation over heroics. The update itself is a restart. The work is in the plumbing around it: rings that do not fight your feature update policy, Autopilot devices that are targeted from their first check-in, compliance rules that understand 26H1, scripts that do not depend on WMIC, and reporting that is switched on before you need it. Get those right this week and the October 13 deadline for 24H2 Pro becomes a non-event.

References

Auto-Updating Enterprise App Catalog Apps in Intune: What GA Actually Changes

Third-party app patching has been the quiet tax on every Intune estate I run. Chrome, 7-Zip, Notepad++, Zoom, the JDKs – none of them are hard to package, but multiplied across a catalog of apps and a monthly cadence, the packaging-and-supersedence treadmill eats real hours. Enterprise App Management (EAM) took the first bite out of that when it shipped the Microsoft-hosted Enterprise App Catalog. The auto-update option – now Generally Available – takes the rest.

I read the short write-up on Xplore the Cloud and it is a good primer on the toggle. This post goes a layer deeper: the licensing reality, how auto-update differs from guided supersedence, the caveats Microsoft tucks into the docs that will bite you in production, how to monitor it, and a rollout playbook I would actually follow with a customer.

On the visuals in this post. Rather than embed portal screenshots, I have linked each step to the exact Microsoft Learn page that shows the official UI – so the images you see are always current with the portal instead of going stale in a blog. If you are reproducing this internally, capture from your own tenant so the branding matches.

What EAM and the Enterprise App Catalog Actually Are

Enterprise App Management is an Intune capability that gives you a Microsoft-curated catalog of prepackaged Win32 apps (EXE and MSI) hosted by Microsoft. When you add one, Intune pre-fills everything you would normally reverse-engineer yourself:

  • Install and uninstall commands
  • Detection rules (file version, file size, registry)
  • Requirements (OS architecture, minimum OS)
  • Restart behaviour, return codes, install context (system vs user)

The catalog is large – well over a thousand titles today, from Adobe Acrobat and Google Chrome for Business to the whole Eclipse Temurin / Zulu JDK matrix, 7-Zip, Notepad++, Firefox, PowerToys and Wireshark. Content is served from *.manage.microsoft.com and installed by the Intune Management Extension (IME) – not winget, which is a common misconception.

See the current catalog and the add flow: Add a Windows catalog app (Win32) to Intune on Microsoft Learn lists every title and walks the wizard step by step.

The licensing reality (check this first)

EAM is not part of base Intune. It requires a subscription in addition to Intune Plan 1/Plan 2, and you get it one of three ways:

  1. As part of the Microsoft Intune Suite
  2. As the standalone Enterprise App Management add-on SKU
  3. Bundled into Microsoft 365 E5 – the change that makes this genuinely worth revisiting, because a lot of my customers already own E5 and were never using the feature

A quick way to confirm the entitlement is actually provisioned: go to Apps > Windows > Create and open the App type dropdown. If Enterprise App Catalog app is not in the list, the tenant does not have EAM enabled yet – licensing alone is not enough, the entitlement has to be present. (I checked a Plan-2-only tenant while writing this and the option simply is not there, which is the fastest tell.) See Microsoft Intune plans and pricing for the SKU details.

Two Update Models: Guided Supersedence vs Auto-Update

Before GA, keeping a catalog app current meant guided update supersedence: Intune surfaced available updates under Apps > Enterprise App Catalog apps with updates, you created a new app version, and you wired up a supersedence relationship to replace the old one. Controlled, reviewable – and manual. It is still fully supported and documented under Guided update supersedence for Enterprise App Management.

Auto-update collapses that loop. Enable it on a catalog app with a Required assignment and Intune detects new catalog versions and pushes them to targeted devices automatically. No new app, no supersedence relationship, no monthly click-through.

Here is the honest comparison:

Guided update supersedence Automatically update
Trigger You create the new version + supersedence Intune detects the catalog version
Review before deploy Yes No
Phased rollout / rings Yes (via assignments) No – all targeted devices at once
Assignment types Required and Available Required only
Rollback / uninstall remediation You control it None built in
Change-control friendly Yes Not really
Effort per update Manual, recurring Zero after setup

Neither is strictly better. Auto-update is fantastic for the low-risk long tail (utilities, runtimes, browsers on a fast ring). Guided supersedence still earns its keep where you need a maintenance window, a pilot ring, or a change record.

Enabling Auto-Update

The switch lives in the app-creation wizard, not in a global setting. When you add an Enterprise App Catalog app, the update method is presented as part of the flow:

  1. Apps > Windows > Add > Enterprise App Catalog and pick your app.
  2. Work through the app information and configuration (accept the pre-filled install/detection logic unless you have a reason not to).
  3. On the assignment step, set a Required assignment – auto-update does nothing for Available assignments.
  4. Choose the update method: the default is Update with Supersedence; select Automatically update instead.

The exact screen: the update-method choice appears on the assignments step. Microsoft documents it under Add a Windows catalog app – Step 6: Assignments, which shows the “Automatically update” option in context.

You can spot auto-update apps afterwards by adding the catalog/auto-update column or filter in the Windows apps list. Note that the list does not pin a static version number for these apps – the version is whatever the catalog currently serves, which is the whole point.

The Caveats That Will Bite You

This is where the vendor blogs stop and production begins. Microsoft documents these limitations, but they are easy to miss (see the Limitations and known issues section of the Enterprise Application Management docs):

  • You cannot flip the update method on an existing app. Supersedence -> auto-update (or back) is not editable. To move an already-deployed app onto auto-update you create a new catalog app with auto-update, then use supersedence to uninstall the old one. Plan the migration; there is no in-place switch.
  • No rollback or automatic uninstall remediation. If a bad version ships, auto-update will not pull it back. Remediation is manual – an Uninstall intent or a remediation script.
  • Malicious-version revocation is on you to remediate. If Microsoft pulls a compromised version from the catalog, it posts a notice in the admin center, but you have to find and fix affected devices.
  • Catalog cache lag of up to one hour. The catalog is cached, so a revoked or new version can take up to 60 minutes to reflect – a real exposure window during a security event.
  • No rollout rings or phased deployment. New version out = every targeted device, simultaneously. There is no built-in ring. If you want staging, you build it yourself with separate assignment groups, or you stay on guided supersedence.
  • Reporting shows latest state only. Intune keeps the current reported state per device, not a full version history. Mid-rollout, different devices legitimately show different states.
  • Not supported as a blocking app in the Enrollment Status Page or Autopilot Device Preparation. Use a fixed-version catalog app for ESP gating.
  • No running-app detection. Intune cannot tell whether the app is open when it updates. For an editor or browser mid-session, that can mean a forced close. This is the caveat I would flag hardest to end users.
  • Do not double-manage a title. If a separate LOB/Win32 assignment targets the same app, you get a version race condition. One app, one deployment type.

Monitoring Auto-Update

You lose the pre-deploy review gate, so lean harder on reporting:

  • Enterprise App Catalog apps with updates (Apps blade) – shows which catalog apps have newer versions available. For auto-update apps this is informational, but it is your catalog-freshness pulse.
  • Managed Apps report (per device) – lists installed/not-installed/available apps for a device with application, version, resolved intent, and install status. This is your ground truth for “what version is actually on this machine right now.” See Intune reports overview – Managed Apps report.
  • Per-app device install status – the standard app monitoring blade still applies; expect churn while a version rolls out because reporting reflects only the latest state.

Automating with Graph

Everything above is Graph-addressable through the deviceAppManagement/mobileApps surface (win32CatalogApp / mobile app supersedence resources). If you manage app deployments as code, you can query which catalog apps are on auto-update and audit assignments in bulk rather than clicking through the portal – handy across a multi-tenant MSP estate.

# Requires Microsoft.Graph, scope DeviceManagementApps.Read.All
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "DeviceManagementApps.Read.All"

# List Enterprise App Catalog (Win32 catalog) apps and their assignment intent
Get-MgDeviceAppManagementMobileApp -Filter "isof('microsoft.graph.win32CatalogApp')" -ExpandProperty assignments |
  Select-Object DisplayName, Id,
    @{n='Intent';e={ ($_.Assignments.Intent) -join ',' }} |
    Format-Table -AutoSize

Treat the exact resource types as version-dependent – check the current Intune Graph reference before you build automation on them, because the catalog-app schema is still evolving.

A Rollout Playbook

This is roughly how I would introduce auto-update to a customer rather than flipping everything at once:

  1. Confirm licensing and entitlement. Intune Suite, the EAM add-on, or M365 E5 – and verify the Enterprise App Catalog app type actually appears in the Create wizard. If it is E5, you already paid for it.
  2. Pick the safe long tail first. Utilities and runtimes where a forced update mid-use is a non-event: 7-Zip, Notepad++, PowerToys, the JDKs, CLI tools. Leave user-facing editors and browsers for later.
  3. Deploy as a new Required app with Automatically update to a pilot group. Remember you cannot convert existing supersedence apps in place – build new and supersede the old.
  4. Watch the Managed Apps report for a cycle to confirm devices land on the expected version.
  5. Communicate the no-running-app-detection reality. Tell users that catalog apps may update and close silently, so they should save work. This single message prevents most of the support tickets.
  6. Keep guided supersedence for anything that genuinely needs a maintenance window, a phased ring, or a change record. Auto-update is a tool, not a religion.
  7. Do not double-manage. Retire any legacy LOB/Win32 package for a title before you put it on auto-update.

FAQ

Is EAM auto-update free?
No. It needs the Enterprise App Management entitlement – via the Microsoft Intune Suite, the standalone EAM add-on, or a Microsoft 365 E5 subscription that includes it. Base Intune Plan 1/Plan 2 alone does not surface the catalog.

Can I switch an existing catalog app from supersedence to auto-update?
No. The update method is fixed at app creation. Create a new catalog app with Automatically update, then use supersedence to uninstall the old one.

Does auto-update support update rings or phased rollout?
No. When a new version is published, it goes to all targeted devices at once. If you need staging, use separate assignment groups or stay on guided supersedence.

Does it work for apps assigned as “Available”?
No. Auto-update applies only to Required assignments. Available apps continue to use the existing update workflow.

Will Intune wait if the app is running?
No. There is currently no running-application detection, so an update can close an app that is in use. Warn your users.

Can I roll back a bad version automatically?
No. There is no built-in rollback. Remediate manually with an Uninstall intent or a remediation script.

The Bottom Line

Auto-update turns EAM from a faster packaging tool into something closer to a managed patch service for a large slice of your third-party Windows estate. For the low-risk long tail it is close to set-and-forget, and if you are on Microsoft 365 E5 it costs you nothing extra to start. Just go in eyes-open: there is no rollback, no native ring model, and no running-app detection, so match the update model to the risk of each app rather than reaching for the switch on everything. Start with the boring utilities, watch the reporting, and expand from there.

References and Further Reading

Using a FIDO2 Security Key Over RDP to Windows Server 2022: On-Prem, Hybrid and Entra-Joined

“I want to RDP into a Windows Server 2022 and log in with my FIDO2 security key instead of typing a password.” It sounds like a single feature you turn on. It is not. Whether it works at all depends on one thing most people skip past: what your server and your client are joined to.

Before you touch a single setting, you also need to be clear about which of two completely different things you actually want, because they share the word “FIDO2” and almost nothing else:

  1. Authenticate the RDP logon itself with a FIDO2 key – passwordless sign-in to the remote server.
  2. Redirect a FIDO2 key into the session so a web app or app inside the RDP session can use WebAuthn, while the key stays plugged into your local machine.

These have different requirements and different failure modes. Let me take them in order, and for the first one walk through all three join states.

First, the one that trips everyone up: a FIDO2 key is an Entra credential

This is the single fact that makes the rest of the post make sense. A FIDO2 security key is registered in Microsoft Entra ID. It is not, by itself, an on-premises Active Directory credential.

So when you log on to a remote server with a FIDO2 key, two things have to happen:

  • Entra ID authenticates the key.
  • Something has to turn that into a Kerberos ticket the on-prem world (and the server) understands.

That second step is where the join state decides your fate.

Scenario 1: FIDO2 sign-in to the RDP session

Entra-joined

The cleanest case. If both your client and the target are Microsoft Entra joined, FIDO2 sign-in over RDP works with the modern RDP stack (the web-account-selector flow) on current Windows 10, Windows 11 and Windows Server 2022 builds.

The catch with servers: pure Entra join is not supported on Windows Server. Server SKUs do not Entra-join the way a client does. So in practice “Entra-joined target” applies to Windows 10/11 remote hosts, and your Windows Server 2022 box lands in the hybrid scenario below even when the rest of your estate is cloud-first.

What you need:

  • Client (and where applicable the host) Microsoft Entra joined.
  • FIDO2 enabled as an authentication method in Entra ID > Authentication methods (see Microsoft’s FIDO2 enablement guide), with the user in scope and a key registered.
  • Current Windows builds on both ends and an up-to-date RDP client.

For an Entra-joined client signing into an Entra-joined Windows 10/11 host, there is no Kerberos-trust plumbing to configure – it largely just works once the method is enabled.

Hybrid-joined (this is where Server 2022 actually lives)

Because Windows Server 2022 cannot be pure-Entra-joined, hybrid is the realistic target join state for a server. Both the client and the server are Microsoft Entra hybrid joined – joined to on-prem AD and registered to Entra ID.

Here you must build the bridge that turns the Entra FIDO2 authentication into an on-prem Kerberos ticket. That bridge is Microsoft Entra Kerberos, deployed as cloud Kerberos trust:

  • Run the Entra Kerberos setup to create the Microsoft Entra Kerberos Server object in your on-prem AD. It shows up as a special computer object (effectively a read-only-DC-style KDC object) that lets Entra ID issue partial TGTs for your AD domain.
  • Configure Windows Hello for Business cloud Kerberos trust via Intune or Group Policy so the FIDO2/WHfB credential is allowed to request those tickets.
  • Enable the security key sign-in credential provider on the machines. On Entra-joined clients this is on by default; on hybrid-joined devices you turn it on explicitly – via Intune (Authentication method / “Enable security key sign-in”) or the equivalent ADMX policy Turn on security key sign-in under Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > System > Logon.

With cloud Kerberos trust in place, the flow is: key authenticates to Entra, Entra issues a partial TGT, the on-prem DC completes it, and the server gets a Kerberos logon it trusts. Service tickets and authorization stay on your on-prem domain controllers – you are not moving authorization to the cloud, only the initial credential.

If FIDO2 RDP “authenticates but won’t log on to the server,” cloud Kerberos trust is almost always the missing piece.

On-prem only (no Entra at all)

Here is the honest answer: the native FIDO2 credential provider does not work for on-premises-only devices. Microsoft is explicit about this. No Entra, no FIDO2 sign-in – because there is nothing to issue the Entra side of the credential.

That does not leave you stuck, but it does mean changing the question. Your realistic options are:

  • Use the key as a smart card. Many FIDO2 keys also carry a PIV/smart-card applet. Stand up AD CS (your on-prem PKI), issue smart-card logon certificates onto the key, and you get certificate-based passwordless RDP using the long-standing smart-card logon path. RDP already knows how to redirect a smart card reader into the session. This is “passwordless RDP with a security key” in the literal sense, but the mechanism is smart-card logon, not FIDO2/WebAuthn.
  • Go hybrid. If passwordless-with-FIDO2 specifically is the goal, the supported route is to hybrid-join the estate and deploy cloud Kerberos trust as above. For most shops this is the better long-term answer than building out smart-card PKI just for RDP.
  • A third-party MFA-for-RDP product if you want a step-up factor on top of passwords without the PKI or Entra work.

So: pure on-prem FIDO2 sign-in is not a checkbox – it is either smart-card-via-PKI or a move to hybrid.

Scenario 1 at a glance

Join state (client + server)FIDO2 RDP logon?What you have to configure
Entra joined (Win10/11 host)YesFIDO2 method enabled in Entra; current builds
Hybrid joined (typical for Server 2022)YesEntra Kerberos (cloud Kerberos trust) + WHfB cloud trust + security key sign-in enabled
On-prem only (no Entra)Not nativelyKey-as-smart-card via AD CS PKI, or move to hybrid

Scenario 2: WebAuthn redirection into the session

Different problem, much smaller. You do not want to log into the server with the key – you want a website or app running inside the RDP session to use the FIDO2 key that is physically plugged into your local PC.

That is WebAuthn redirection, and the good news is:

  • It is supported on Windows Server 2022 (and Windows 10 1809+ / Windows 11).
  • It is on by default. There is no positive switch to flip – you only need to make sure nobody disabled it.

The control that matters lives on the server (the RDP host) as Group Policy:

Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Remote Desktop Services > Remote Desktop Session Host > Device and Resource Redirection > Do not allow WebAuthn redirection

Set it to Disabled or Not Configured to allow redirection. If it is Enabled, redirection is blocked and any in-session FIDO2 prompt fails instantly.

This is the one I see bite people most often, and the cause is almost always the same: a hardened golden image. CIS benchmarks and a lot of corporate baselines set “Do not allow WebAuthn redirection” to Enabled. If your security key worked fine on the local desktop but dies the moment you are inside RDP, check this policy before anything else. The ADMX comes from the Windows 11 22H2 administrative templates or newer, so make sure your Central Store is current too.

On a current Remote Desktop client you opt in on the Local Resources tab by ticking WebAuthn (Windows Hello or security keys). For the full walkthrough of using your key inside the session – including Windows 11 client cross-device passkey support – see the companion post: Using Your FIDO2 Key From Inside the RDP Session.

Picking the right path

  • “I want to log into the server with my key.” → Scenario 1. Find your join state in the table. For a real Windows Server 2022, that almost always means hybrid + cloud Kerberos trust.
  • “I want to use my key for a website/app running on the server.” → Scenario 2. Confirm “Do not allow WebAuthn redirection” is not Enabled, and you are done.
  • “We are on-prem only and want passwordless RDP.” → It is not native FIDO2. Either key-as-smart-card via AD CS, or move to hybrid.

Wrap-up

The reason “enable FIDO2 over RDP” has no single answer is that the key is an Entra credential and your server probably is not pure-cloud. Sort out the join state first, then the rest follows: Entra-joined is nearly free, hybrid needs cloud Kerberos trust, and on-prem-only means smart-card PKI or a hybrid move. And if it is really just an in-session web app you are after, the whole thing collapses to one Group Policy that your hardening baseline may have already turned off.

Getting Ready for Windows 11, version 26H2: Upgrade Paths, Autopatch, and Tracking Pilot to Production

Microsoft has confirmed the next annual feature update, Windows 11, version 26H2, and the headline for IT is a familiar one: this is an enablement package (eKB), not a full OS swap. If you have been through the 24H2 to 25H2 cycle, the playbook is almost identical – but there are a couple of new wrinkles worth planning around. This post walks through the supported upgrade paths, how you drive it with Windows Autopatch and Intune, and how to actually track the rollout from pilot to production.

What 26H2 actually is

26H2 shares the same servicing branch as 24H2 and 25H2. That means for devices already on those versions, the upgrade is delivered as a tiny enablement package – around 174 KB – that simply flips the version and build number (build 26300) after a single restart. No multi-gigabyte download, no long offline phase, no feature-update reboot marathon. The new capabilities ship continuously through monthly cumulative updates and are switched on by the eKB.

Microsoft frames it as “a predictable, low-disruption update experience for organizations and IT professionals,” and from a deployment standpoint that is exactly what it is – an update ring approval rather than a migration project. Expect general availability in the fall of 2026, in line with previous H2 releases.

Upgrade paths – know your starting point

The delivery method depends entirely on the version a device is sitting on today:

  • Windows 11 24H2 / 25H2 – direct eKB upgrade. ~174 KB, one restart. This is the easy 95% for most managed fleets.
  • Windows 11 23H2 and older – different servicing branch, so no eKB. These need the full feature-update media path (~6.5 GB download and the full upgrade experience).
  • The 26H1 caveat – 26H1 sits on a separate Windows core branch and does not roll forward to 26H2 via the standard enablement path. If you have any 26H1 (specialized/insider) devices, plan a different route for them.
  • Windows 10 – no shortcut here. These are full upgrades (or, frankly, replacements) and should already be on your end-of-support migration plan.
Windows 11 26H2 upgrade paths: 24H2/25H2 via enablement package, 23H2 and older via full media, 26H1 on a separate branch
Upgrade paths to 26H2 depend on the version a device sits on today.

Action before fall: run an inventory split by OS version now. Anything not already on 24H2/25H2 is your long-tail – get those onto a current branch first so 26H2 becomes a one-restart eKB rather than a 6.5 GB project.

Driving it with Windows Autopatch

If you are on Autopatch, 26H2 is close to trivial to approve – it appears in the feature update flow like any other release, and because the payload is tiny, distribution can complete in a day rather than weeks.

The mechanics you already rely on still apply. Autopatch groups split your estate into deployment rings – Test, First, Fast, and Last. If you do not define extra rings, Test acts as your pilot and Last as production. Releases flow sequentially through the rings, and Autopatch monitors device telemetry the whole way – if failure or compatibility signals spike, it can automatically pause progression to the next ring.

  • Pilot: keep Test/First small but representative – mix hardware models, key line-of-business apps, and a few power users who will actually report friction.
  • Soak time: because the eKB is so small, the temptation is to rush. Resist it – the value of a pilot is the soak window, not the download time. Give each ring a real bake period to surface app and driver issues.
  • Safety net: you retain Pause, Resume, and Rollback for feature updates directly from Intune if a ring goes sideways.

Not on Autopatch? The same model is available with Intune Feature Update profiles plus Update Rings – you target 26H2 as the feature update version and stagger deferrals/rings manually. You lose the automatic ring progression and telemetry-driven pause, but the staged approach is the same.

Autopatch deployment rings Test, First, Fast, Last with telemetry-driven pause and rollout tracking
Autopatch rings, the telemetry safety net, and what to watch as you promote from pilot to production.

Tracking pilot to production

This is where most rollouts get loose. “We deployed it” is not the same as “we can prove the estate moved.” Here is the reporting stack I lean on:

  1. Reports > Windows Autopatch – the two Autopatch reports give you ring-level rollout status and quality/feature update health. This is your primary “where is each ring” view.
  2. Reports > Device management > Windows Updates – the feature update report and readiness reporting validate which devices are eligible and which are blocked, before and during the push.
  3. Email notifications – make sure your Autopatch admin contacts are current so you actually receive the proactive alerts rather than discovering issues in a dashboard.
  4. A simple version-count KQL/report – track devices reporting build 26300 over time as your single “percentage on 26H2” number for management. Watch the curve per ring, not just the total.

Define your exit criteria before you start: e.g. pilot ring at >95% success with zero unresolved Sev-1 app issues for X days before releasing the next ring. Let the telemetry and your soak window – not the trivial download size – gate each promotion.

Support lifecycle

The usual split applies: Enterprise, Education, IoT Enterprise and Enterprise multi-session get 36 months of support, while Home, Pro, Pro Education and Pro for Workstations get 24 months (support running to roughly October 2028). Factor that into whether 26H2 is a “move now” or a “this fall” decision for each ring.

A short pre-flight checklist

  • Inventory by OS version – identify anything not on 24H2/25H2.
  • Get the long-tail (23H2 and older, Windows 10) onto a current branch first.
  • Flag any 26H1 devices for a separate path.
  • Confirm Autopatch groups / Intune feature update profiles and rings are sane.
  • Verify Autopatch admin contacts and reporting access.
  • Write down your per-ring exit criteria and soak windows.

Further reading and references

Bottom line: 26H2 is an approval, not a migration – for the devices that are on a current branch. Spend your effort on the long-tail and on a disciplined pilot-to-production cadence, and the eKB itself will be the least interesting part of the project.

Fix the iTunes Sign-In Prompt on Intune-Managed iPhones: iOS Store App vs VPP Device Licensing

You manage a fleet of corporate iPhones through Microsoft Intune. Enrollment is automated through Apple Business Manager (ABM), apps deploy silently through the Volume Purchase Program (VPP), and users never see an App Store login. Then one day, your service desk starts getting tickets:

“Sign in to iTunes Store. Sign in to allow Contoso A/S to manage and install apps.”

A handful of devices show the prompt at first. A few days later, dozens. Users tap Cancel, the dialog disappears, and a few hours later it reappears. Some users sign in with personal Apple IDs to make it go away, which is exactly what you do not want on a corporate device.

This is one of those issues that looks like an Apple ID, ABM, or enrollment problem – but almost never is. In every case I have worked, the root cause was the same: somewhere in the tenant, an app was added as an iOS Store App when it should have been added as an iOS Volume Purchase Program app. This post walks through why those two app types behave so differently, how to confirm which one is causing the prompt, and how to fix the issue across a large device estate without disrupting users.

Why iOS Devices Ask for an Apple ID in the First Place

Intune offers several iOS app types in the admin center. Two of them install the same app from the same App Store listing, but they have completely different licensing and installation behavior:

  • iOS Store App – A direct link to a public App Store listing. The app installs into the user’s iCloud account. The device must be signed in to the App Store with a personal or managed Apple ID for the install to complete. There is no concept of device-based licensing.
  • iOS Volume Purchase Program app (VPP) – An app license that your organization owns through Apple Business Manager. With Device licensing, the license is assigned to the device itself – no Apple ID is required on the device for the install. The app simply appears.

The two app types look almost identical in the admin center. Both can point to the same App Store URL. Both can be assigned as Required, Available, or Uninstall. The difference is invisible until a device tries to install the app and discovers it has no Apple ID signed in.

When an iOS Store App is assigned as Required to a supervised device with no Apple ID, iOS does what it is told – it prompts the user to sign in so the install can proceed. That is the prompt your users are seeing.

Why You May Not Have Seen This Before

A fresh ABM enrollment with VPP apps assigned through Device licensing never triggers an Apple ID prompt because no app on the device needs one. The issue surfaces when somebody adds the same app a second time – as an iOS Store App – usually because they pasted the App Store URL into the wrong “Add app” wizard. The VPP version may still be present, but the iOS Store App duplicate is now competing for the same slot on the device, and only one of them can win.

How to Confirm This Is Your Issue

Before you start changing assignments, confirm the diagnosis. Three quick checks usually settle it.

Check 1: List All iOS Apps with Required Assignments

In the Intune admin center, go to Apps > iOS/iPadOS and filter the list. Look at every app where the App type column shows iOS store app. For each one, open the app and check Properties > Assignments.

Any iOS Store App with a Required assignment is a candidate for the prompt. iOS Store Apps assigned only as Available or Uninstall do not trigger the prompt – they sit quietly in the company portal or only act when the user actively removes the app.

Check 2: Cross-Reference with VPP

For each suspect iOS Store App, search for a VPP version of the same app. The naming will be similar but not identical – the VPP version typically shows the publisher and a different icon variant. If both versions exist, the iOS Store App is almost certainly redundant.

Check 3: Look at the Audit Log

Intune’s audit log will tell you exactly when each app was added and by which admin account. Go to Tenant administration > Audit logs and filter on the Mobile App category. Search for the app name and check the Create entries. In one recent case, an admin had bulk-added a dozen iOS Store App duplicates within a 20-minute window – clearly someone working through a list using the wrong wizard.

If checks 1 and 2 confirm the duplication and check 3 confirms when it happened, you have your root cause.

Why You Cannot Just Delete the iOS Store App

The natural reaction is to delete the iOS Store App duplicate and be done with it. Resist that urge until you have a rollout plan, because three things can go wrong:

  1. Users still see the prompt until iOS finishes its install queue. iOS does not automatically discard a pending install when its source is removed. The user has to Cancel the prompt at least once – sometimes more than once – before the MDM channel processes the change.
  2. Required and available install intent on a managed device is sticky. If the VPP version is not already assigned and licensed at the device level, removing the iOS Store App leaves users with no app at all.
  3. Filters and groups can overlap in non-obvious ways. If the iOS Store App is assigned to a broad group and the VPP version is assigned to a different broad group, deleting one may pull the app from devices that should still have it.

The safe sequence is: assign the VPP version with Device licensing first, validate on a single device, then remove the iOS Store App.

The Pilot Approach: Validate on One Device Using Assignment Filters

Before you touch a production assignment, prove the fix on one device. Intune’s Assignment Filters make this clean.

Step 1: Create a Single-Device Filter

In the Intune admin center, go to Tenant administration > Filters > Create.

  • Platform: iOS/iPadOS
  • Name: Something obvious like Pilot-iPhone-XYZ123-only
  • Rule syntax:
(device.deviceName -eq "XYZ123")

Replace XYZ123 with the actual device name from Devices > iOS/iPadOS devices. Use Edit in advanced mode if you prefer to write the rule directly.

Step 2: Exclude the Pilot Device from the iOS Store App Assignment

Open the problematic iOS Store App in Intune. Go to Properties > Assignments > Edit. On the existing Required assignment, click Filter and set:

  • Filter mode: Exclude
  • Filter: Pilot-iPhone-XYZ123-only

This tells Intune to apply the iOS Store App’s Required assignment to everyone except the pilot device. The pilot device is now isolated from the prompt – existing prompts may still need to be dismissed once, but no new ones will queue.

Step 3: Assign the VPP Version with Device Licensing to the Pilot Device

Open the VPP version of the same app. If it does not yet have a Required assignment to the same target group, create one:

  • Assignment type: Required
  • Group: The same group the iOS Store App was assigned to
  • License type: Device
  • Filter: Pilot-iPhone-XYZ123-only
  • Filter mode: Include

This is the inverse of Step 2 – the VPP assignment now applies only to the pilot device. The rest of your estate still gets the (about to be removed) iOS Store App version; the pilot device gets the VPP version with a device-bound license.

Step 4: Have the Pilot User Dismiss the Prompt and Sync

Walk the pilot user through these exact steps:

  1. When the iTunes sign-in prompt appears, tap Cancel.
  2. Open Settings > General > VPN & Device Management > the MDM profile.
  3. Tap Sync to force a check-in.

Within a minute or two, the VPP version of the app installs silently. No Apple ID prompt. The app shows the small organisation marker indicating it was installed by MDM.

If the install fails or the prompt comes back, stop and investigate before going further – usually the cause is a missing VPP license assignment or an expired VPP token (more on tokens below).

Rolling Out the Fix to the Rest of the Estate

Once the pilot is green, the rollout is mechanical. For each affected app:

  1. On the VPP version, remove the Pilot-XYZ123-only filter so the Required + Device-licensing assignment applies to the full target group.
  2. On the iOS Store App version, remove the existing Required assignment entirely. Do this before deleting the app to avoid an Intune sync that might re-prompt users.
  3. Delete the iOS Store App entirely once no devices reference it. This also makes sure nobody re-uses it accidentally later.

If you have several apps to fix, work through them one at a time. iOS handles MDM commands serially, so a batch change can produce more prompts than you would expect.

What Users Should Expect

Communicate clearly to end users before you flip the assignment. A short email along these lines works well:

Over the next 24 hours, you may see a sign-in prompt on your work iPhone asking you to log in to iTunes or the App Store. Please tap Cancel. Do not enter any Apple ID. The app you are missing will install automatically within a few minutes after you cancel the prompt.

The behaviour is non-obvious: iOS only processes the next MDM command after the current prompt is dismissed. Until the user taps Cancel, the device is effectively stuck waiting for the user.

Cleanup: Filters, Duplicates, and Audit Trail

After the rollout is complete, do not leave the scaffolding in place:

  • Delete the pilot assignment filter (Pilot-iPhone-XYZ123-only) so it does not get reused accidentally.
  • Confirm both iOS Store App duplicates are deleted – keeping them around “just in case” invites the same mistake again next quarter.
  • Document what happened in your change log so future admins know the difference between iOS Store App and VPP and which to use.
  • Run a tenant-wide review of remaining iOS Store Apps. Any iOS Store App with only Uninstall or Available (without enrollment) assignments is safe. Any iOS Store App with a Required assignment to a device group should be evaluated.

A Quick Reference: iOS Store App vs VPP at a Glance

AspectiOS Store AppiOS VPP App (Device licensing)
SourcePublic App Store URLApple Business Manager (purchased)
Requires Apple ID on deviceYesNo
Required-install on supervised devicesTriggers iTunes sign-in promptInstalls silently
License consumedNone tracked by MDMOne per device
Revoke licenseNot possibleYes, from Intune
Update behaviorSame as App StoreSame as App Store
CostFree apps only (in practice)Free and paid apps
Recommended for managed iOSNoYes

The short version: on a corporate-owned iOS device managed through Apple Business Manager, VPP with Device licensing is the only app type that should appear as Required for first-party and approved third-party apps.

How to Prevent This from Happening Again

The root cause is almost always procedural – an admin selected the wrong app type from the Intune wizard. A few controls reduce the chance of recurrence:

  • Document the standard. Add a one-line rule to your Intune operations doc: “All Required iOS apps must be added as iOS Volume Purchase Program apps. iOS Store Apps may only be used for Available or Uninstall assignments.”
  • Restrict app creation with RBAC. Use scope tags and Intune’s role-based access control to limit app creation to a small group of admins who know the difference. The principle of least privilege applies to MDM tenants too.
  • Use audit log alerts. Microsoft Graph + a small Logic App can email you whenever a new iOS Store App is created. Quick to set up, quick to react.
  • Check the VPP token expiry. A frequent secondary cause is an expired VPP token. When a token expires, Intune cannot create or renew Device licenses, and admins reach for “iOS Store App” as a workaround that turns into a permanent footgun. Renew the token annually and set a calendar reminder a month in advance.

Healthy VPP Token Practices

A VPP token has a 12-month validity. When it is close to expiry, Intune shows a banner in the Tenant administration > Connectors and tokens > Apple VPP Tokens view. After expiry:

  • Existing licensed apps continue to function.
  • New licenses cannot be assigned.
  • Token renewal requires a new .vpptoken file from Apple Business Manager.

If your token has just been renewed and apps are stuck in Failed state, revoke and re-assign licenses one app at a time. Bulk re-assignment occasionally fails for individual apps, and the only way to clear the failed state is a manual revoke + reassign cycle.

Troubleshooting: When the Prompt Will Not Go Away

If you have applied the fix and a specific device is still prompting, work through these in order:

  1. Has the user tapped Cancel at least once? iOS sometimes queues multiple install commands – the user may need to dismiss two or three prompts before the queue drains.
  2. Force a sync. From the device: Settings > General > VPN & Device Management > MDM profile > Sync. From Intune: Devices > select device > Sync.
  3. Confirm the device is licensed for the VPP version. Open the VPP app in Intune > Device install status. The device should be listed with Installed or Pending. If it is Not applicable, the assignment is not reaching the device – check group membership and filters.
  4. Check the VPP token health. Tenant administration > Connectors and tokens > Apple VPP Tokens. If the token shows any warning, address that first.
  5. Reboot the device. Last resort, but occasionally clears a stuck MDM channel.

If you have exhausted these, look at the device’s Managed Apps report. An app that should be VPP-licensed but appears under iOS Store App lineage indicates the old assignment is still active somewhere – usually a forgotten filter or a duplicate group assignment.

FAQ

Will users lose any data when I switch from iOS Store App to VPP?

No. The App Store install and the VPP install are the same app binary from the same listing. Local data and settings are preserved across the transition because iOS treats them as the same bundle ID.

Do I need a managed Apple ID for VPP with Device licensing?

No. Device licensing is the entire point – the license is bound to the device hardware identity, not to any Apple ID. The device can have no Apple ID signed in at all, and VPP apps will still install.

Can I keep using iOS Store Apps for some apps?

For apps you want to make optionally available to users through the Company Portal, yes – assign them as Available. For Required deployment to corporate-owned devices, no. Switch them to VPP.

What about iPadOS devices?

The same rules apply. iPadOS uses the same MDM commands and the same VPP licensing model as iOS. If you have iPads in the same affected group, they will exhibit the same prompt behaviour and be fixed by the same approach.

It can be. A token renewal sometimes leaves individual app licenses in a Failed state until they are re-assigned. This is a separate issue from the iOS Store App vs VPP problem, but you may encounter both at once if the same admin tried to “work around” the failed VPP state by adding iOS Store App versions. Treat the VPP licensing failures as a separate workstream once the prompt is gone.

Summary

If iOS devices managed by Microsoft Intune are showing an iTunes or App Store sign-in prompt, do not start with Apple ID configuration, ABM enrollment, or DEP profiles. Start with your app inventory. Look for iOS Store Apps with Required assignments that overlap with VPP versions of the same app. Fix one device first using assignment filters, then roll the change out to the rest of the estate, and finish by deleting the iOS Store App duplicates entirely.

The technical fix is simple. The harder part is preventing the next admin from making the same selection in the same wizard – so document the standard, restrict who can add apps, and keep your VPP token healthy. Your users will never see another iTunes prompt, and your service desk will get its mornings back.

References

How to Remove Classic Microsoft Teams with PowerShell and Intune Proactive Remediations

Microsoft officially retired Classic Teams on July 1, 2025, and the client is no longer functional. Despite this, many organizations still have remnants of Classic Teams scattered across their Windows device estate. This is not just a cosmetic issue. Classic Teams no longer receives security updates, the per-user installation model wastes disk space, leftover shortcuts confuse users, and end-of-life software can put you out of compliance. If you have been putting off the cleanup, now is the time to remove Classic Teams from your environment.

In this post I am sharing three PowerShell scripts that handle different scenarios, from a one-off standalone removal to a fully automated Intune Proactive Remediations approach.

Why You Need to Remove Classic Teams

Even though Classic Teams stopped working months ago, there are real reasons to actively remove it rather than just leaving it behind:

  • Security – Classic Teams no longer receives security updates, leaving a potential attack surface on your endpoints
  • Disk space – The per-user installation model means Classic Teams can consume hundreds of megabytes per user profile on a device
  • User confusion – Leftover shortcuts and autorun entries can confuse users, especially when New Teams is already deployed
  • Compliance – Many organizations have policies requiring the removal of end-of-life software from managed devices
  • Clean device state – Leftover registry entries and autorun configurations can interfere with New Teams or cause unexpected behavior

What Gets Removed

All three scripts target the same Classic Teams components:

  • Teams Machine-Wide Installer – The MSI-based installer typically deployed via SCCM, GPO, or during OS deployment
  • Per-user Teams installations – Classic Teams installed itself per-user under %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Teams for each profile on the device
  • Autorun registry entries – Both HKLM and per-user Run keys that launch Classic Teams at logon
  • Desktop and Start Menu shortcuts – Leftover .lnk files pointing to the old Teams client
  • Teams Installer folder – The C:\Program Files (x86)\Teams Installer directory

Option 1: Remove Classic Teams with a Standalone Script

If you need to remove Classic Teams from a smaller number of devices, or want to run the cleanup through SCCM, ConfigMgr, GPO, or manually, use the standalone removal script. It handles the complete removal process in a single run: stops Teams processes, uninstalls the Machine-Wide Installer via msiexec, iterates through all user profiles to remove per-user installations, cleans up registry entries and shortcuts, and validates the result.

Script: Remove-ClassicTeams.ps1

Usage

Run the script as SYSTEM or with local administrator privileges:

powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File Remove-ClassicTeams.ps1

The script creates a log file at C:\Windows\Logs\Remove-ClassicTeams.log for troubleshooting.

Option 2: Remove Classic Teams with Intune Proactive Remediations

For organizations managing devices through Microsoft Intune, the preferred approach is to use Proactive Remediations (now called Remediations in the Intune admin center). This gives you a detection script that identifies non-compliant devices and a remediation script that automatically cleans them up.

Detection Script

The detection script checks whether you still need to remove Classic Teams by scanning all common locations. If any remnant is found, it exits with code 1 (non-compliant), which triggers the remediation script. If the device is clean, it exits with code 0 (compliant).

Script: Detect-ClassicTeams.ps1

The detection checks include:

  • Teams Machine-Wide Installer in both 32-bit and 64-bit uninstall registry keys
  • Classic Teams folder, Teams.exe, and Update.exe in each user profile
  • Teams desktop shortcuts across all profiles
  • HKLM Run entry for Teams

Remediation Script

When the detection script flags a device as non-compliant, the remediation script will remove Classic Teams and perform the full cleanup. It goes further than the standalone script by also cleaning Start Menu and Startup folder shortcuts, loading offline user registry hives to remove per-user Run entries, and removing the Teams Installer folder from Program Files.

Script: Remediate-ClassicTeams.ps1

After remediation, the script runs its own validation. If all remnants are successfully removed, it exits with code 0. If anything remains, it exits with code 1, which Intune will flag for review.

Setting Up the Proactive Remediation in Intune

  1. In the Intune admin center, navigate to Devices > Remediations
  2. Click Create script package
  3. Give it a name, for example: Remove Classic Microsoft Teams
  4. Upload Detect-ClassicTeams.ps1 as the detection script
  5. Upload Remediate-ClassicTeams.ps1 as the remediation script
  6. Set Run this script using the logged-on credentials to No (runs as SYSTEM)
  7. Set Run script in 64-bit PowerShell to Yes
  8. Assign the remediation to a device group – start with a pilot group before targeting all devices
  9. Set the schedule – daily is recommended until the bulk of devices are cleaned up, then reduce to weekly

Logging

All three scripts write detailed logs to C:\Windows\Logs:

  • Remove-ClassicTeams.log
  • Detect-ClassicTeams.log
  • Remediate-ClassicTeams.log

Each log entry includes a timestamp, severity level (INFO, WARN, ERROR), and a descriptive message, making it easy to verify that the scripts successfully remove Classic Teams. This makes it straightforward to troubleshoot any issues through Intune device diagnostics or by reviewing the log files directly.

Summary: Remove Classic Teams the Right Way

Cleaning up Classic Microsoft Teams is a necessary task for any organization that has migrated to New Teams. Whether you run the standalone script through your existing deployment tools or leverage Intune Proactive Remediations for automated, ongoing compliance, these scripts give you a reliable way to get it done.

All scripts are available on my GitHub:

If you have questions or run into issues, feel free to reach out.

BlackLotus and the 2026 Secure Boot Certificate Expiry: What It Means and How to Fix It

If you manage Windows devices in any kind of enterprise environment, the Secure Boot certificate expiry is a deadline you really do not want to sleep on. The Microsoft certificates that have been the foundation of UEFI Secure Boot since Windows 8 are reaching the end of their lifetime in 2026, and the clock is ticking. The first wave of expirations begins in June 2026, and if your fleet is not ready by then, devices will start losing the ability to receive boot-level security updates and to trust software signed with new certificates.

The reason this matters is not just calendar housekeeping. The whole reason we are rotating these certificates in the first place is the BlackLotus UEFI bootkit (CVE-2023-24932), a piece of malware that can survive an OS reinstall and even bypass Secure Boot itself. The 2023 certificate set is the long term answer, and you need every Windows device in your environment trusting it before the old certificates roll off.

In this post I want to walk through what BlackLotus actually is, what is happening with the Secure Boot certificates, how the two are connected (but not the same thing), and what you can practically do about it today using Intune, PowerShell, and the great work that several Microsoft MVPs have already shared with the community.

A Quick Refresher on BlackLotus

BlackLotus is a UEFI bootkit that exploits CVE-2023-24932, a vulnerability in the Windows boot manager. What makes it particularly nasty is that it loads before Windows does, which means it sits underneath every traditional security control you have in the operating system. Antivirus, EDR, even a clean reinstall of Windows will not necessarily get rid of it, because the malicious code lives in the boot path that Secure Boot is supposed to protect.

Microsoft addressed CVE-2023-24932 with a multi-phase rollout that started back in 2023 and is still in progress today. The fix is not just a patch you install. It involves updating the bootloader, revoking the trust of the vulnerable boot manager, and ultimately replacing the certificates that Secure Boot uses to decide what is allowed to run. That last part is the piece we are dealing with right now.

The Secure Boot Certificate Expiry: What Is Actually Going Away in 2026

There are three Microsoft certificates from 2011 that are baked into firmware on basically every Windows device shipped in the last decade. Here is the short version of what is going away and when:

  • Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011 – the Key Enrollment Key authority. Expires June 2026.
  • Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011 – signs third party UEFI components and option ROMs. Expires June 2026.
  • Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011 – signs the Windows boot manager itself. Expires October 2026.

The replacements are the 2023 certificate set: Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2023, Microsoft UEFI CA 2023, and Windows UEFI CA 2023. These are the certificates Microsoft is using going forward to sign boot components, and they are also the ones that carry the BlackLotus mitigations.

How BlackLotus and the Certificate Expiry Are Connected, but Not the Same Thing

This is the part I see people mixing up the most, so it is worth being precise. BlackLotus and the certificate expiry are two different problems that share a single solution.

  • BlackLotus (CVE-2023-24932) is a security vulnerability. It exists because the old boot manager can be tricked into running malicious code. The fix is to revoke trust in the vulnerable boot manager and replace it with a new one signed by a new certificate.
  • The 2026 certificate expiry is a lifecycle event. The 2011 certificates were always going to expire eventually. June 2026 is simply when their validity runs out.

Where they meet is the 2023 certificate set. Microsoft is using this rotation as the opportunity to also roll out the BlackLotus mitigations at the same time. So when you update a device to trust the 2023 certificates, you are doing two things in one go: you are getting it ready for life after the 2011 certificates expire, and you are closing the BlackLotus attack path.

If you do nothing, the consequences are not the same on both sides either. A device that never gets the 2023 certificates will still boot after June 2026. It just will not be able to install future Secure Boot updates, will not trust new third party UEFI components, and will remain exposed to BlackLotus style attacks. That is not a place you want to be.

How to Fix It

The good news is that the actual remediation is mostly registry plumbing. Microsoft ships the certificate update logic inside the cumulative update, and you opt a device in to receiving the new certificates by setting a value under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Secureboot. Specifically, the AvailableUpdates DWORD controls which steps are applied. The current recommended value is 0x5944, which performs the full sequence: it adds the 2023 KEK to KEK, adds the 2023 DB entries, updates the boot manager, and updates DBX. After the registry value is set, the Microsoft\Windows\PI\Secure-Boot-Update scheduled task is what actually does the work, usually across one or more reboots.

At a high level the process for any device looks like this:

  1. Make sure the device is fully patched. Anything earlier than the July 2024 cumulative update is not going to do you any favors.
  2. Confirm that diagnostic data is set to at least Required, because the certificate update flow uses it.
  3. Set AvailableUpdates to 0x5944 under the Secureboot key.
  4. Trigger the Secure-Boot-Update scheduled task (or wait for it to run on schedule).
  5. Reboot. Sometimes more than once. Verify by checking the UEFICA2023Status registry value, which should eventually read Updated.
  6. Validate by querying the actual Secure Boot databases with PowerShell to confirm the 2023 certificates are present.

The cleanest way to do this at scale is with Intune Remediations. You build a detection script that reports back whether a device already has the 2023 certificates installed, and a remediation script that sets the registry values and kicks off the scheduled task. That gives you a single dashboard view of your whole fleet and lets you target the long tail of devices that need a nudge.

Things That Will Trip You Up

  • OEM firmware. Some older devices will need a UEFI/BIOS update from the manufacturer before they can accept the 2023 certificates. If you have a fleet that is more than four or five years old, plan on doing a firmware audit as part of this project.
  • Diagnostic data. If telemetry is set to Off (Security on Enterprise), the certificate update flow will not run. You need at least Required.
  • Dual boot and custom signed bootloaders. If you are running anything that depends on the 2011 UEFI CA (some Linux distributions, some hardware vendors’ utilities), test before you push the update broadly.
  • Virtual machines. Hyper-V Generation 2 VMs and Azure VMs are also affected. Do not forget the server side of the house.
  • Monitor first, remediate second. Microsoft’s recommended approach is to start with a monitor-only Intune Remediation that just reports status, so you understand the scope of the problem before you start changing anything.

Reference Articles From the Community

I am far from the first person to write about this, and several Microsoft MVPs have already done excellent deep dives that are well worth your time. If you are about to start this project, read these first:

GitHub Scripts You Can Use Today

If you would rather start from working code than write your own from scratch, several community members have published their detection and remediation scripts on GitHub. Always read through any script before deploying it in your environment, but these are good starting points:

Conclusion

The 2026 Secure Boot certificate rotation is one of those rare projects that touches every Windows device in your environment, including the ones nobody has thought about in years. It is also one of those projects that is going to be infinitely easier if you start now than if you wait until May 2026 and try to do it under pressure. The combination of Intune Remediations, the registry-based opt-in flow, and the great scripts already shared by the community means there is no real reason to put it off.

Start with monitoring so you know what you are dealing with, fix any firmware and telemetry prerequisites, and then roll out the remediation in waves. Closing the door on BlackLotus is a nice bonus on top of staying ahead of the certificate expiry, and your future self (and your security team) will thank you.

How to Deploy Applications to Microsoft Teams Rooms (MTR) with Intune Using Remediation Scripts

Introduction: The Challenge of Managing Microsoft Teams Rooms

Microsoft Teams Rooms (MTR) are purpose-built devices that bring seamless Teams meetings into physical conference rooms. However, if you’re an IT admin or consultant trying to manage these devices with Microsoft Intune, you may have already hit a major wall: you can’t deploy standard applications like Win32 or MSI packages.

In this post, I’ll walk you through:

  • Why app deployment fails on MTRs
  • How to use Intune Proactive Remediation Scripts to install apps anyway
  • A real-world script-based workaround you can implement today

This article is especially useful for IT administrators, Microsoft 365 consultants, and organizations managing MTR on Windows devices using Microsoft Intune.

What Are Microsoft Teams Rooms (MTR) Devices?

Microsoft Teams Rooms are specialized endpoints running Windows or Android, designed to facilitate video conferencing in meeting spaces.

This article focuses on MTR on Windows, which:

  • Boots into a kiosk-like shell
  • Uses a locked-down local user account (usually “Skype”)
  • Automatically launches the Teams Rooms app
  • Is managed differently from typical Windows endpoints

Why Are MTRs So Locked Down?

Because they’re designed to do one thing very well: run meetings reliably and securely. That means:

  • Minimal background processes
  • No user distractions
  • Reduced vulnerability footprint

Unfortunately, this also means limited support for app deployment using traditional Microsoft Intune methods.

Why Standard App Deployment Doesn’t Work on MTR

Let’s quickly review how app deployment in Intune normally works:

  • You upload a Win32 or MSI app
  • Intune pushes it to the device
  • The app installs silently in the background

But MTRs are a special case:

IssueDescription
Kiosk ShellMTR devices run a locked-down shell that prevents user interaction.
Limited Admin AccessThe logged-in “Skype” user doesn’t have full local admin rights.
Silent Installs Often FailEven SYSTEM-context installs can hang or fail silently.
Win32 App Deployment Not SupportedMTRs are excluded from full app deployment via Intune.

TL;DR: Intune treats MTRs like they’re manageable—but for apps, they’re basically off-limits.

What Can You Manage on MTR with Intune?

FeatureMTR Support?
Enroll in Intune✅ Yes
Configuration Profiles (Wi-Fi, Certificates)✅ Yes
Compliance Policies✅ Yes
PowerShell Scripts⚠️ Limited
Win32/MSI App Deployment❌ Not Supported
Store App Deployment❌ Not Supported
Remediation Scripts✅ Yes — this is our workaround!

The Workaround: Use Proactive Remediation Scripts

What Are Proactive Remediations in Intune?

Proactive Remediations are part of Endpoint Analytics in Microsoft Intune. They allow you to:

  • Detect issues on endpoints (e.g., missing apps or settings)
  • Run scripts in the SYSTEM context to remediate them

And because these scripts run as SYSTEM, they can bypass the user restrictions imposed by the MTR shell. That’s the secret sauce here.

Step-by-Step: Deploy Apps to MTR Devices Using Remediation Scripts

Step 1: Choose an Application

Pick an application with a silent installer. Examples include:

  • Zoom Rooms Plugin
  • Custom certificate tools
  • Remote support agents

Pro tip: Avoid apps that require UI interaction or restart the system.

Step 2: Host the Installer

Since you can’t upload Win32 apps, host the installer externally:

  • Azure Blob Storage with SAS token
  • SharePoint Online
  • A secure HTTPS server

Step 3: Write the Detection Script

This script checks whether the app is already installed.

powershellCopyEdit# Detect-Zoom.ps1
$app = Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_Product | Where-Object { $_.Name -like "*Zoom*" }
if ($app) {
    exit 0  # App is installed
} else {
    exit 1  # App is missing
}

Exit code 1 tells Intune that remediation is needed.

Step 4: Write the Remediation Script

This script installs the application silently.

powershellCopyEdit# Remediate-Zoom.ps1
$installerUrl = "https://yourstorage.blob.core.windows.net/apps/ZoomRoomsInstaller.msi"
$tempPath = "$env:TEMP\ZoomInstall.msi"
$logPath = "C:\ProgramData\ZoomInstall.log"

Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $installerUrl -OutFile $tempPath -UseBasicParsing

Start-Process "msiexec.exe" -ArgumentList "/i `"$tempPath`" /quiet /norestart /log `"$logPath`"" -Wait

Remove-Item $tempPath -Force

Store logs in C:\ProgramData\ for later troubleshooting.

Step 5: Deploy via Intune

  1. Go to Endpoint Security > Endpoint Analytics > Proactive Remediations
  2. Click + Create Script Package
  3. Upload both scripts (Detect and Remediate)
  4. Assign the policy to a dynamic group of MTR devices
  5. Set the schedule (e.g., once a day)

Tip: Filter devices by naming convention like MTR-*.

Real-World Example: Install Chocolatey on MTR

Let’s say you want to deploy Chocolatey to MTR devices to enable future package management.

Detection Script

powershellCopyEditif (Get-Command "choco" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
    exit 0
} else {
    exit 1
}

Remediation Script

powershellCopyEditSet-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process -Force
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
iex ((New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://chocolatey.org/install.ps1'))

This installs Chocolatey silently using PowerShell.

Security Tips for Remediation Scripts on MTR

Best practices to stay secure:

  • Use SAS tokens for Azure Blob Storage to avoid public links.
  • Avoid complex UIs or restarts in your install logic.
  • Sign your scripts with a trusted certificate if possible.
  • Log everything: install logs, errors, success flags.

How to Maintain This Workaround

Treat remediation scripts like code:

  • Version control with GitHub or Azure Repos
  • Store application versions and update logic
  • Schedule re-checks weekly or monthly
  • Rotate download URLs periodically if they expire

When Should You Use This Workaround?

Use CaseGood Candidate?
Small hotfix✅ Yes
Lightweight plugin✅ Yes
Large apps with UI❌ No
Mission-critical installs⚠️ Use caution

For complex applications, consider a manual install window, or coordinate with the OEM.

Alternatives to Intune Remediation Scripts

MethodNotes
Manual DeploymentGood for one-off fixes
OEM Management ToolsLogitech Sync, Poly Lens, etc.
Group PolicyWorks for Hybrid AAD Join MTRs
Teams Pro ManagementUseful for Teams config, not apps

Conclusion: MTR App Deployment is Possible—With the Right Tools

Deploying applications to Microsoft Teams Rooms using Intune isn’t supported natively—but that doesn’t mean it’s impossible. With a bit of scripting and smart use of Proactive Remediation, you can achieve automated, scalable, and relatively safe application installs.

This method:

  • Uses supported Intune features (Endpoint Analytics)
  • Works in the locked-down MTR environment
  • Scales across multiple devices and locations

Intune Connector for Active Directory – What To Know About The Latest Security Update

Microsoft is offering clients an updated Intune Connector for Active Directory and this connector is what Intune will be using starting from Intune 2501. This connector uses Windows Autopilot to deploy devices that are Microsoft Entra hybrid joined.

The updated version of the connector aims to enhance security and will be using a Managed Service Account (MSA) instead of a SYSTEM account. Customers currently using the old version of the Intune Connector for Active Directory (that uses the local SYSTEM account) should know that this connector will no longer have support, starting in late June 2025.

Therefore, it’s important to start planning for the update because once support ends, enrollments from the old connector build will no longer be acceptable.

Key Features of the Intune Connector

The main role of the Intune Connector for Active Directory is to join computers to an on-premises domain and add them to an organizational unit (OU) allowing for central management and policies.

The Intune Connector also places joined computers within a specific OU, something that helps establish granular control over device configurations and settings. Furthermore, customers will also benefit from hybrid enrollment of devices which offers the convenience of device management by both on-premises AD and Intune.

The Intune Connector plays a key role in leveraging Windows Autopilot to set up and deploy devices. And for all those already using Autopilot, they will know that this feature will have a huge impact in making life easier for customers by simplifying deployment processes.

In addition to all the above, the Intune Connector ensures that the policies defined in both AD and Intune continue to enforce, thus offering compliance and consistency.

Why Switch to Managed Service Accounts?

As the new version of the Intune Connector for Active Directory makes the change to using Managed Service Accounts, it’s important to understand why they are important. The use of MSAs will enable the new connector to follow least privilege principles and thereby strengthen security.

With MSAs, clients enjoy managed domain accounts that have automatic password management. They are also generally permissible with privileges to perform their duties. With such measures in place, there is a reduction in the risk of compromise, intentional or otherwise.

You can only use standalone MSAs on one domain-joined machine and can thus only access resources within that domain. MSAs can easily and securely run services on a computer while simultaneously maintaining the capability to connect to network resources as a specific user principal. When taking all of this into account, it’s not difficult to see why Microsoft views the use of MSAs as better for the Intune Connector moving forward.

Securing The Future

The security update to the Intune Connector for Active Directory fits in seamlessly with Microsoft’s Secure Future Initiative. Microsoft is uniquely ideal within the tech industry to play a key role in safeguarding the future for all its clients.

As such, the tech giant is taking a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity with a key focus on certain areas that are critical to enhancing security across the board. There continues to be substantial progress in these areas:

identity and secret protection

Updates to Entra ID and Microsoft Account (MSA) are live for both public and U.S government clouds to generate, store, and automatically rotate access token signing keys using the Azure Managed Hardware Security Module (HSM) service.

Microsoft has continued to drive broad adoption of its standard identity SDKs, which provide consistent validation of security tokens. As a result, we now see this standardized validation covering more than 73% of tokens issued by Microsoft Entra ID for Microsoft owned applications.

Tenant Protection and Isolation of Production Systems

A full iteration of app lifecycle management for all production and productivity tenants has been performed. This has resulted in the elimination of 730,000 unused apps. Additionally, because of the elimination of 5.75 million inactive tenants, the potential cyberattack surface has become significantly smaller.

Not only that, but a new system to streamline the creation of testing and experimentation tenants with secure defaults is available. It also enforces a strict lifetime management.

Protect networks

More than 99% of physical assets on the production network record in a central inventory system. This enriches asset inventory with ownership and firmware compliance tracking. Virtual networks with backend connectivity are isolated from the Microsoft corporate network, as well. They are additionally subject to complete security reviews to reduce lateral movement.

With the expansion of platform capabilities such as Admin Rules to ease the network isolation of platform as a service (PaaS) resources such as Azure Storage, SQL, Cosmos DB, and Key Vault, Microsoft has made it easier for customers to secure their own deployments.

Protection of engineering systems

We are now experiencing more consistent, efficient, and trustworthy deployments because 85% of production build pipelines for the commercial cloud are now using centrally governed pipeline templates.

Other notable changes include shortening the lifespan of Personal Access Tokens to seven days, disabling Secure Shell (SSH) protocol access for all Microsoft internal engineering repos, and massively reducing the number of elevated roles with access to engineering systems.

Moreover, proof of presence checks for critical chokepoints in software development code flow are now available.

THREAT DETECTION AND MONITORING

A lot of progress continues toward the goal of pushing all Microsoft production infrastructure and services to adopt standard libraries for security audit logs. Additional efforts include those to emit relevant telemetry and to retain logs for a minimum of two years.

A good example is the establishment of central management and a two-year retention period for identity infrastructure security audit logs, including all security audit events throughout the lifecycle of current signing keys. Add to this the fact, that no less than 99% of network devices now have enablement with centralized security log collection and retention.

Accelerate response and remediation

We can now observe improved time to mitigate for critical cloud vulnerabilities because of the recent process updates across Microsoft. Customers will also appreciate the greater transparency provided by the publishing of critical cloud vulnerabilities as common vulnerability and exposures (CVEs). This is especially helpful even when there are no direct customer action requirements.

In addition to this, the establishment of the Customer Security Management Office (CSMO) will go a long way to improve public messaging and customer engagement for security incidents. 

Required Permissions

As we look at the new version of the Intune Connector for Active Directory, one of the key areas that can help us distinguish this new connector from its previous version is doing a comparison of account permissions:

 Old ConnectorNew Connector
Logged On AccountSYSTEMDomain/MSA
Password ManagementSet by user, subject to domain rulesManaged by domain only – automatically reset
Privilege Set SizeMAX5 Privileges:   SeMachineAccountPrivilege – Disabled default SeChangeNotifyPrivilege – Enabled Default SeImpersonatePrivilege  –  Enabled Default SeCreateGlobalPrivilege –   Enabled Default SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege – Disabled default
Registry Access RightsFull, implicitRead write, explicit
Enrollment Certificate RightsFull, implicitFull, explicit
Create Computer Object Rights (required for hybrid Autopilot scenario)Unlimited if connector is on the same machine as domain controller. Delegation is required if connector is not on the domain controller.Explicit delegation required

Pre-requisites

As with any product or application, there are certain requirements that all customers intending to use the Intune Connector for Active Directory will need to meet. So, before proceeding with the set up of the new Intune Connector, you need to verify that you can meet all the pre-requisites. These requirements include:

  • The computer you’re installing Intune Connector for Active Directory to must be running Windows Server 2016 or later.
  •  You should also verify that you have .NET Framework version 4.7.2 or later installed.
  • To facilitate communication with Microsoft’s Intune service, the server hosting the Intune Connector should have internet access.
  • The Intune Connector will need standard domain client access to domain controllers.
  • Customers must verify that they have a Microsoft Entra account with Intune Service Administrator permissions, as this is a requirement to download and manage the connector.
  • Also needed will be a domain account with local administrator privileges and the ability to create msDS-ManagedServiceAccount objects.
  • Verify that the Windows Server configuration aligns with the Desktop Experience and, for versions 2019 or earlier, install the Microsoft Edge browser manually before connector setup.
  • The Microsoft Entra account should have an Intune license assigned to it.
  • For those that will be using Hybrid Azure AD Join, they should check that it’s configured via Azure AD Connect tool.
  • Lastly, the Intune Connector machine must have the appropriate delegated permissions to create computer objects in the target OU.

Setting Up The Connector

To setup the new Intune Connector for Active Directory, you need to start by uninstalling the existing connector. You can do this by uninstalling from the Settings app on Windows and then, uninstalling using the ODJConnectorBootstrapper.exe (select Uninstall). With that done, you can download the connector build from Intune and then perform the installation (as described in detail in my previous blog).

Configuring organizational units (OUs) for domain join

Customers should be aware that by default MSAs won’t have access to create computer objects in any Organizational Unit (OU). Thus, if you intend to use a custom OU for domain join, you’ll need to update the ODJConnectorEnrollmentWiazard.exe.config file. Fortunately, this is something you can do before or after connector enrollment:

  • Update ODJConnectorEnrollmentWizard.exe.config:
  • Default location is “C:\Program Files\Microsoft Intune\ODJConnector\ODJConnectorEnrollmentWizard”
  • Add all the OUs required in OrganizationalUnitsUsedForOfflineDomainJoin
  • OU name should be the distinguished name.
  • You need to be aware that the MSA is only granted access to the OUs configured in this file (and the default Computer’s container). This means that if any OUs are removed from this list, completing the rest of the steps will revoke access.
  • Open ODJConnectorEnrollmentWizard (or restart it if it was open) and select the “Configure Managed Service Account” button.
  •  If successful, a pop up will appear showing success.

Using the Intune Connector with multiple domains

For those who are already using the connector with more than one domain, they will be able to use the new connector by setting up a separate server per domain and installing a separate connector build for each domain.

Configuring the connector

  • Customers should install the Intune Connector for Active Directory on each of the domains that they want to use for domain join. In case a second account redundancy is required, customers must install the connector on a different server (in the same domain).
  • Go through the connector configuration steps meticulously and verify that everything has been done correctly. Also check that the MSA has the appropriate permissions on the desired OUs.
  • Verify that all connectors are present in the in the Microsoft Intune admin center (Devices > Enrollment > Windows > under Windows Autopilot, select Intune Connector for Active Directory) and that the version is greater than 6.2501.2000.5.

Configure Domain Join profile

Follow the steps given below.

  • Start by creating a domain join profile for each domain that you want to use for hybrid joining devices during Autopilot.
  • Target the domain join profile to the appropriate device groups.

Wrap Up

The Intune Connector for Active Directory provides an essential tool for managing hybrid devices in an Intune environment. With its many available features, customers will get centralized management capabilities for their environments thus allowing businesses to operate more efficiently.

But, with security having been a big concern for many, Microsoft has made the switch to using a Managed Service Account instead of a SYSTEM account. This action has effectively tightened security in customers’ environments. Going forward, the previous version of the Intune Connector will no longer be supported. Therefore, if you are yet to download and set up the new Intune Connector for Active Directory, the sooner you do the better.